I. Introduction
Hirschel Kasper's study 1 on the impact of collective bargaining on public school teachers finds little relation between unionization and average state salary levels.
We contend that the Kasper regression equations do not fairly test the impact of teacher organization for at least three reasons:
(1)
They use state data as observations in the cross sectional analysis in spite of the rather obvious concentration of unionization and salary determination at the local school district level. (2) They use average salaries in the state as the dependent variable thus introducing sensitivity to the distribution of teachers through the steps in the salary scale as well as sensitivity to the degree of homogeneity among school districts in the state.
They ignore the 5tructure of the school districts in the state which we contend is an important offset or aid to goals of unionization.
In addition to thr'se major objections to the Kasper study we also wish to raise several minor objections of a more technical nature to the methods employed.
Although conceptually separate, the problems of the use of average and state aggregation compound each other in practice to the point where we choose to discuss them together in Section II.
The primary objections to the use of average salary as the dependent variable center around the assumption of a linear relation between collective bargaining and salary and lack of homogeneity among the districts.
Section III deals with the importance of school district monopsony in the wage determination process. In the case of teachers such an effect is much more likely than in industry generally. High wages in organized districts would tend to reduce the number of teachers desired as capital is substituted for labor (in the form of teaching aids etc.). As states have a tendency to be closed systems (because of teacher certification requirements, the extent of secondary wage earners, and other geographic Immo- '. bilities) and because other professions are not close substitutes for teaching employment, such a reduction of demand in organized districts will increase the teacher supply available in non-organized districts which will depress salary levels there.
In such a closed system it seems unlikely that unionization (other than uniform)
could ever raise average state salary significantly.
Other possible problems associated with average salary are introduced by (1) inclusion in the average of both highly qualified and marginal teachers, (2) inclusion of teachers at many different stages of their careers (and steps in the pay scale), and (3) teachers from areas very different in average income and general labor market conditions. Each of these objections deserves elaboration.
In those states with uniform and high requirements for teacher certification it may be reasonable to aggregate to state average salary. 3 Here the standard deviation among districts in teacher quality will be low.
In states with relatively low requirements, on the other hand, there will be a substantial variation in teacher preparation and qualification among districts. This differential reflects in part variations in income and ability to pay and in part the preferences of the community for spending on public education. Averaging teacher salaries for states without regard Just as the effect of unionization should be a function of the distribution of union members between districts, so, too, the impact of income, state aid and other ability to pay parameters may depend critically on their distribution. Assume, for example, that the income elasticity of district spending on public education declines after some "normal" or "average" level of per student expense has besn achieved. In this circumstance a higher level of spending for the state (and a higher level of salaries for teachers) will be associated wtih nearly equal distribution of ability to pay among the school districts in the state. A substantial element of unequal distribution would lower the average. This introduces an unknown bias when comparisons are made between states with various degrees of homogeneity. This bias will be reduced by state aid to the extent that it offsets the inequalities between districts.
II/. Market Structure
Wage rates depend on product market structure as well as collective bargaining.
In particular, we contend that the degree of monopsony power of the school district 4. Note that Kasper himself uses the entrance salary for policemen in comparing average teachers' salaries to the salaries of other public employees.
-6-plays a critical role in the determination of salary levels.5 A single large school district including virtually all of the teachers and students in a metropolitan area possesses monopsony power. A teacher desiring comparable employment within the profession must move to another city, a difficult alternative especially to a profession including so many secondary wage earners. On the other hand, many small districts in an area will compete against each other for the better teachers and in so doing increase the average wage. 4e have tested this influence in a sample of 135 urban school districts and found the number of school districts to be a strong and positive factor in the determination of starring salaries for new teachers with bachelor's degrees.
The following regression equations summarize this finding for the three sub-samples ((1) relates to districts with 25,000 to 50,000 students, (2) to distlicts with 50,000 to 100,000 students, and (3) to districts with more than 100,000 students).7
( The significance of per-capita income (X2) and the number of school districts in the county (X1) indicate to us both the necessity of including the monopsony variable and the desirability of the district as the appropriate level at which to test the relation between product and labor market structure and wage rates. Monopsony power of local school districts will tend to offset the power of unions organization.
On the other hand strong competition among suburban school districts and between them 5. This is true in other industries as well. See, for example [4).
6. Data collected from [6) , [9) , [10), and [11).
7. a indicates significance at the .995% confidence level, d indicates significance at the 90% confidence level. Standard errors are bracketed. The 135 districts in the sample break down to 42 in classification (1), 69 in classification (2), and 2i. in classification (3).
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and the central city for teaching personnel may result in very high rates of compensation with or without collective bargaining. Certainly this factor cannot be completely ignored in attempting to isolate the independent role of teacher organization and bargaining.
IV. Other Issues
While our principal difficulty in accepting the conclusions of the Kasper paper involve the level of aggregation, there are at least two other aspects of this paper that puzzle us. These relate to the significance test used and the method employed in the two stage least squares estimation.
The first of these is a fairly minor statistical point. Kasper's hypothesis is that the average salary level is positively related to the level of organization.
Therefore, in conducting his significance tests, we would naturally expect him to state as the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient for the organization variable is zero and as the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient is greater than zero. In other words, a one-tailed test is clearly in order. Kasper, however, employs two-tailed tests and thereby attributes less significance to his findings than is actually warranted by the data. For example, in his equation (3), Kasper states that the coefficients for the unionization variables are significant at the .10 level using a two-tailed test. If a one-tailed test had been used, the coefficients would be significant at the .05 level.
The second point about his statistical methods is much more serious. After by dro?ping variables that ace known to be important, he has also subjected his estimates of the :egression coefficients to statistical bias and made even more difficult the assessment of the significance of these estimates. 10 We believe that this 1r3 a serious failing.
9. Where there are so many exogenous variables that this is impossible, it is more commonplace to select a smaller set of exogenous variables or to employ principal components of those exogenous variables. Michael D. McCarthy has shown [5] that the same sot of first stage regressors should be ised for each of the endogenous variables :In any given structural equation and thet this set should include the exogenous variables from the equation under consideration.
If this rule is not followed, the estimates are not :onaistent.
